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Abstract
In an economy with asymmetric information, the smart contract in the blockchain protocol mitigates un-
certainty. Since, as a new trading platform, the blockchain triggers segmentation of market and differentiation
of agents in both the sell and buy sides of the market, it reconfigures the asymmetric information and gen-
erates spreads in asset price and quality between itself and traditional platform. We show that marginal
innovation and sophistication of the smart contract have non-monotonic effects on the trading value in the
blockchain platform, its fundamental value, the price of cryptocurrency, and consumers’ welfare. Moreover,
a blockchain manager who controls the level of the innovation of the smart contract has an incentive to keep
it lower than the first best when the underlying information asymmetry is not severe, leading to welfare loss
for consumers.
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1. Introduction
Since Bitcoin was proposed by Nakamoto (2008), the notion of the blockchain has gone viral as a new, innova-
tive way to manage information. It provides a decentralized, public information management system in which
data can be recorded as valid only if a consensus has been reached. Moreover, Ethereum, the second-largest
blockchain, has invented a protocol to implement a smart contract—one that is executed automatically based
on specified conditions without any centralized authorizations (Szabo, 1997). We can exploit this protocol
to exchange assets, products, and information. For example, many blockchain-based trading platforms have
been launched, such as those for foods (EY Advisory & Consulting, Walmart), jewelry (HyperLedger), arts
and photography (Kodac), security (tZero), and cryptocurrency (Waves, IDEX, Steller, Oasis, OKEx, Cashaa,
and more).
In spite of this growth, the academic research on these topics is still in its infancy. We contribute to the lit-
erature by proposing a simple yet intuitive theory that explores the economic implications of blockchain tech-
nology. In accordance with previous research (see the next subsection), our primary focus is on the blockchain
as a new platform for exchanging goods and assets. Given that the technology aims to improve informa-
tion management, we consider an asymmetric information problem regarding the assets traded. Moreover,
since the blockchain works as a new platform and is operated in parallel with a traditional exchange with
no blockchains, it has the features of a multi-platform economy with two-sided markets, as described in the
field of industrial organization (IO). We investigate how innovation in blockchain technology affects the seg-
mentation of the trading platforms, the price and quality of the assets traded, information asymmetry, and
consumers’ welfare. We also define the fundamental values of the blockchain platform and its attached cryp-
tocurrency.
The smart contract is one of the most innovative aspects of the blockchain system, which differentiates
it from the traditional exchange protocol with cash or credit. In traditional exchange, there is no way to
eliminate the asymmetric information a priori, and the possibilities of adverse selection and market breakdown
are omnipresent. To mitigate this problem, a typical economy relies on intermediations by a third party,
such as banks, insurance providers, and central securities depositories, to offload the risks. In contrast, a
blockchain transaction is immune from information asymmetry due to the security mechanism hard-wired
into the protocol. As discussed in Section 2., transaction information stored in the blockchain is protected from
tampering, that is, rewriting the transaction record comes at a prohibitively large cost. Crucially, Ethereum
allows the transactions to be executed based on sophisticated scripts; users can write a code on the blockchain
that describes the specific conditions they wish them to fulfill. Hence, the transaction can be state contingent,
and the validity of “state information” is highly credible. This highlights the difference of the blockchain
protocol from credit as a record-keeping method, since the latter is not responsible for the actual transfer and
quality of goods, while both of them are automatically guaranteed on Ethereum.
We consider non-atomic sellers and buyers who decide what type of transaction platform to use to ex-
change assets whose quality (high or low) is unknown to buyers. We define the smart contract in our economy
by claiming that a transaction by means of the blockchain technology bears less information asymmetry. The
traditional market (cash-market or C-market) cannot detect low-quality assets, and buyers face severe quality
uncertainty. On the blockchain platform (B-market), in contrast, the low-quality assets can be detected and ex-
cluded before trading occurs with some probability θ, which we call the security level (Appendix A provides
a couple of examples as a micro-foundation for θ). At first, we take θ as an exogenous parameter, whereas in
Subsection 4.4.2. and onward, we study a manager of the blockchain platform who controls θ. Our main focus
is on how θ affects the activity of the entire economy.
As the literature on two-sided markets suggests, the first direct consequence of the emergence of the
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blockchain platform (a positive θ) is the differentiation and segmentation of both the sell and buy sides of
the market. This segmentation is accompanied by endogenous spreads in the quality and price of assets be-
tween the blockchain and traditional platforms. Then, we find that marginal innovation in the security level θ
has non-monotonic effects on the transaction value in the blockchain platform, the fundamental value of this
platform, the price of cryptocurrency, and consumers’ welfare. That is, a more secure blockchain platform
does not necessarily induce more active transactions and better allocation for consumers.
A higher θ directly improves the quality of assets supplied in the B-market, since the smart contract pre-
cludes a certain fraction of bad assets. In addition, quality in the B-market is endogenously amplified by the
general equilibrium effect. The higher quality induces a higher price of the assets traded through the B-market
due to a higher expected return.1 On the supply side, sellers of low-quality assets confront the price-liquidity
(rejection) tradeoff. They can obtain a higher return from trading the asset in the blockchain platform, but
at the risk of being rejected and ending up consuming their own low-quality asset. On the other hand, if a
seller has a high-quality asset, the net return from selling it in the B-market monotonically increases as the bid
price goes up with no fear of rejection. Thus, the reaction to innovation differs depending on the nature of the
seller’s asset, endogenously boosting the flow of high-quality assets into the B-market.
On the demand side, whether the higher security attracts more buyers to the B-market depends on the
relative rise in the assets’ quality versus the increase in the price, i.e., buyers face the traditional price-quality
tradeoff. We show that the improvement in the quality is driven solely by the sell side’s behavior, while the
price change is caused by the increase in the demand and decrease in the supply, which leads to a larger
increase in the price than in the quality. As a result, a higher θ pushes the price up and reduces the transaction
volume, making the B-market “an exclusive market for a high-quality but expensive asset.”
If the primitive asymmetric information is not severe, it is easier for buyers to give up the higher quality
in the B-market and migrate to the C-market to save the price cost. This implies that a higher θ generates a
larger decline in the transaction volume than the increase in the price, leading to less activity in the B-market
as measured by the trading value.
To quantify the fundamental value of the blockchain itself, we also consider a blockchain manager who
proposes an ex-ante contract that enables traders to use the platform for a fee. Access to the blockchain platform
generates a strictly positive welfare gain for market participants, which makes traders willing to pay. This
positive fee can be seen as the fundamental price of the blockchain technology, and we show that its behavior
has the same implications as the trading value in the B-market and is non-monotonic in θ. Therefore, our
model implies that the sophistication of the blockchain, measured by a higher θ, can reduce the technology’s
value as a trading platform.
Based on this non-monotonicity, we discuss the optimal security level θ for the platform manager. As
mentioned earlier, a higher θ can reduce the number of consumers who participate in the B-market, the trading
value, and the aggregate welfare gain for consumers. This implies that the blockchain manager can charge
only a small fee, since, ex-ante, each consumer expects that the gain from participating in the exclusive B-
market is small. This gives the manager an incentive to keep θ lower than the first-best level for consumers
(θ = 1). In other words, she cares only about the transaction value in the B-market and does not reckon with
the effect of θ on the activity in the C-market, making her underestimate the benefit of an increase in θ.2
This decline in the trading value and maximum possible fee tend to occur when the asymmetric infor-
mation is not severe and migration is easier for consumers. In contrast to the conventional perspective, our
results indicate that the government should intervene in the market to promote blockchain transactions when
1The “price of assets in the j-market” is valued in terms of cash, not cryptocurrency. Accordingly, we can see cryptocurrency as an
asset, and its price is also valued in terms of cash.
2This is consistent with the literature on strategic management (Teece, 1986; Brandenburger and Stuart Jr, 1996) arguing that a firm
may not adopt innovation even though it improves consumers’ welfare.
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an information problem is not severe, while it does not need to meddle when it is severe.
After a review of the related literature, Section 2 provides an overview of the technology of the blockchain
and cryptocurrency. Section 3 introduces the theoretical environment, while Section 4 analyzes comparative
statics to understand the effect of higher security in blockchain technology. In Section 5, we propose the
empirical hypotheses, and Section 6 concludes the discussion.
1.1. Literature Review
The research on blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies (or FinTech, in general) is expanding (see Harvey
[2016] for a comprehensive review). First, viewing the blockchain protocol as a new trading platform is widely
accepted. Bartoletti and Pompianu (2017) provide empirical evidence for the usage of the blockchain and the
smart contract as a platform. Chiu and Koeppl (2017, 2018) analyze the optimal design of the blockchain to
guarantee “Delivery vs. Payment” by considering an economy with an intertemporal risk of settlement. Cong,
Li and Wang (2018) develop a model in which the demand and price dynamics of tokens (cryptocurrency) are
driven by the size of the blockchain as a platform and its trading needs.
The blockchain can affect consumers’ welfare through many channels. According to Cong and He (2017),
its reduction of asymmetric information promotes the entrance of firms and improves consumer welfare, al-
though its efficient record keeping makes it easier for firms to collude. Malinova and Park (2017) compare the
possible degrees of transparency of the private blockchain and find that the most transparent setting maxi-
mizes consumers’ welfare at the risk of front-running.3 Khapko and Zoican (2016) focus on the optimal dura-
tion of the transactions under counterparty risk and search friction to show that the optimal implementation
of settlement can improve welfare.4
Our model agrees with these studies on the fundamental effect of the blockchain: it reduces the transac-
tion cost by mitigating informational problems. However, our economy, in which buyers face ex-ante quality
uncertainty, highlights how the blockchain endogenously reconfigures information asymmetry via quality dif-
ferentiation and platform segmentation—both of which are not analyzed in the literature—and how it affects
the value of the blockchain platform and consumers’ welfare.
The second strand of the literature, which emerged from Akerlof (1970), examines adverse selection. Au-
thors such as Kim (2012), Guerrieri and Shimer (2014), and Chang (2017) show that market segmentation leads
to quality differences across markets.5 We see the blockchain as a new platform for trade, which exists along-
side the traditional cash market, and analyze the effect of segmentation in the context of FinTech. Unlike the
literature, in which the markets are homogeneous per se, our analyses propose that the different structure of
one market (e.g., the degree of security) affects the entire economy. Also, these works do not investigate the
manager who optimally chooses the structure of her platform.
Our paper is also related to the literature in IO that analyzes endogenous market structures and platform
competition with two-sided markets. The market segmentation and differentiation of agents have been ana-
lyzed by Foucault and Parlour (2004), Rochet and Tirole (2006), Damiano and Hao (2008), Ambrus and Argen-
ziano (2009), and Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2014), although they do not study asymmetric information in the
form of asset quality uncertainty. Yanelle (1997) and Halaburda and Yehezkel (2013) consider competing plat-
forms under asymmetric information, though they focus on the information asymmetry between the platform
3Users of blockchains can make the network private and limit information transactions within a firm or a group of firms. This cat-
egory of platforms is called a “closed-type” or “permissioned” blockchain. The public blockchain, in contrast, is called “open-type” or
“permissionless.”
4The feasibility of the blockchain implementation is another hot topic. For example, Biais et al. (2018) consider “the folk theorem” of
the blockchain as a coordination game, and Aune, O’Hara and Slama (2017) propose the hash-based protocol to address the issue that
stems from miners’ incentive to delay the publication of the block.
5Another dimension of segmentation is time, i.e., participants can decide when to trade, as analyzed by Fuchs, Green and Papanikolaou
(2016), Asriyan, Fuchs and Green (2017), and Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2017).
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and agents. In line with these works, our platform manager controls the asymmetric information between
agents, while she does not incorporate some types of externality due to the general equilibrium effects.6
Finally, the idea of the blockchain as a record-keeping method that competes with the traditional cash is
reminiscent of the concept of “money as memory.” How money and credit can substitute for each other or
coexist has been explored by Kocherlakota (1998), Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998), Lagos and Wright (2005),
Rocheteau and Wright (2005), Camera and Li (2008), and Gu, Mattesini and Wright (2014). However, credit as
an alternative payment method does not affect the quality of the assets traded because it remains a record of
a debtor, but not of the assets’ quality. Thus, the market segmentation in the literature is intertemporal (day
and night): a decentralized market comes first to make some credit, and a centralized one comes afterwards
to settle repayment. As some evidence in Section 5. suggests, however, the blockchain platform triggers
market segmentation even in a static environment by keeping a record of assets’ quality, making transactions
contingent on it, and differentiating both buyers and sellers.
2. Technology Overview: Blockchain Protocol
The blockchain can be seen as a novel way of managing and tracking transaction information. Participants
in a transaction (say, sellers and buyers) possess private information about their state—how much bitcoin
they own or have already spent, the quality of the products they sell, and so on. In the traditional world, we
typically maintain a ledger that records participants’ state information in a centralized manner, e.g., there is a
bank as an intermediary. Bilateral transactions with no intermediations by a credible third party incur the risk
of adverse selection due to asymmetric information or settlement risk.
In contrast, on the blockchain platform, the ledger is not held by a particular entity, but is distributed
across all participants in the network. The distributed ledger system requires the information about the state of
the economy to be a consensus among all the participants. This highlights its first difference from traditional
transactions, in which only a centralized intermediary keeps track of the state information.
Moreover, Ethereum allows complex scripts to be written to describe the conditions under which the in-
formation is verified and recorded, which implies that a transaction takes place only if the conditions in the
code are fulfilled (i.e., it is state contingent). This is the crucial aspect that differentiates the blockchain from
the credit system (or credit cards) as a record-keeping method.7
In general, it is extremely difficult for one member of the network to overturn the consensus. In the case
of Bitcoin, for example, system managers called miners leverage their computing power to solve a time-
consuming cryptographic problem. This process is called “proof of work,” and the miner who performs it
fastest is entitled to add a new block to the chain. Therefore, if a malicious agent attempts to add fraudulent in-
formation to the transaction history, she must outpace all miners in the network, which requires prohibitively
high computing power.8
Once a set of transaction information forms a block, it is encrypted by a hash function and passed to the
next block to create a chain of blocks. The output of the hash function becomes different if one entity of input
6More broadly, a different security level of the blockchain θ in a market with asymmetric information can be interpreted as government
intervention, such as the purchase of assets on OTC after the recent financial crisis. Most models of government intervention do not
consider the interaction of segmented markets. See, for example, Philippon and Skreta (2012), Tirole (2012), and Chiu and Koeppl (2016).
7A warranty is an example of a similar system to the blockchain. Even though warranties guarantee the quality of products, they have
two main differences. First, warranties are provided and executed only if the product is transferred and the ex-post quality is verified,
while the smart contract transfers the product only if the quality is guaranteed. Thus, they differ in which aspect of the transaction, the
quality or the transfer of products, is contingent on the other. Second, the execution of warranties comes at a significant cost for consumers,
while the smart contract never requires consumers to take the cost because making a transaction serves as a quality certification. See, for
example Lehmann and Ostlund (1974) and Palfrey and Romer (1983).
8There are several ways to reach a consensus, and different blockchains adopt different processes. Chiu and Koeppl (2017) provide a
theoretical comparison of the efficiency of these methods.
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is different. Thus, revising a piece of information in a chain requires the revision of all of the subsequent
information in the blockchain.9 As a result, any attempts to benefit from modifying the existing information
is virtually impossible. That is to say, only relevant information can be added to the blockchain, and it is free
from tampering.
3. Theoretical Framework
Consider an economy with segmented markets that operate at t = 0 and 1. There is a continuum of risk-
neutral buyers (consumers) and sellers (producers), both characterized by the private value α ∈ [0, 1]. α has a
cumulative measure F, which will be assumed to be uniform.10 At date t = 0, each buyer is endowed with a
certain amount of cash w, draws α, and partakes in markets to buy an asset.
On the sell side, each seller is endowed with a unit asset with a stochastic quality q, which is either high,
q = H, or low, q = L, with Pr(q = H) = pi ∈ (0, 1) and independent of α. By the law of large numbers,
the economy-wide fraction of high-quality assets is pi, and that of low-quality assets is 1− pi. Also, risk-free
savings with a zero interest return are available.
For both sellers and buyers with a private value α, the asset yields the following (per capita) utility at date
t = 1:
y(α) =
α if q = Hφα if q = L.
φ ∈ (0, 1) is the primitive quality difference. If the asset is low-quality, agents obtain only φ fraction of the
utility. Following the literature on market microstructure (such as Glosten and Milgrom, 1985), agents can
trade and hold, at most, one unit of asset and cannot short-sale.
3.1. Market Structure
There are two trading platforms with different mediums of exchange. One is the blockchain with cryptocur-
rency and the other is the traditional market with fiat money. We give transactions via the blockchain platform
an index j = B (blockchain) and those with fiat money an index j = C (cash).
Smart Contract
To distinguish transactions via the blockchain from those through the cash market, we define the smart contract
in our model as follows.
Definition 1. θ fraction of low-quality assets that sellers intend to sell in the B-market are detected and rejected
by the blockchain mechanism.
The parameter θ is called the “security level” of the blockchain platform. We provide the motivating
example and micro-foundation of θ in Appendix A. The interpretation of θ can differ depending on the context
in which we apply this model. For instance, if the traded asset is the cryptocurrency itself, such as Bitcoin,
θ is the probability that the mechanism will preclude attempted “double spending.” If the traded asset is
consumption goods, as in the wine blockchain, θ captures how intensively the contracts are made contingent
9For example, if a state of the transaction up to t is denoted by st = (st−1, · · · , s0), a block at t records the information of transactions at
t and the encrypted historical states, St = (st, h(st)), where h is a hash function. Now, the next block at t + 1 records St+1 = (st+1, h(St)),
and so on. If an agent wants to rewrite the past state sk to s′k , then she must change all the blocks Sk , Sk+1, · · · , St because this attempt
induces the change in Sk , which triggers a change in Sk+1 because h(Sk) with sk is not identical to that with s′k , and so on.
10Imposing the same F on both sellers’ and buyers’ α is for tractability and is not essential in our analyses.
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throughout the intermediations between producers and consumers.11 At first, we take this value as given
for participants in the market. Later, in Subsection 4.4.2. and on, we study a case wherein a manager of the
blockchain can control this security level.12
Moreover, to motivate agents to hold cryptocurrency, we introduce the following restriction:
Assumption 1. To buy kB amount of assets at price PB (in terms of cash) in the B-market, a buyer must hold
PBkB/Q of cryptocurrency, where Q is the price of cryptocurrency in terms of cash (see the budget
constraint [1]).
This assumption comes from the fact that the endowment is given by cash. We call it the “cryptocurrency in
advance” (CIA) constraint in our model, and Schilling and Uhlig (2018) consider a similar formulation.13 It
will be clear that the demand and pricing for cryptocurrency are determined mostly outside of the asset trad-
ing market. Therefore, by removing Assumption 1 and imposing it on sellers’ behavior, we can still analyze
the other class of cryptocurrency platforms, such as a part of Ethereum, in which the sellers must have cryp-
tocurrency to verify their authenticity. Also, we show that the fundamental price of blockchain technology
can be characterized even without Assumption 1.
3.2. Optimal Behavior of Buyers
A buyer with type α maximizes her expected consumption at t = 1, V(α) = E[c|α], under the following budget
constraints:
w ≥ PCkC + Qb + s, QPB b ≥ kB, (1)
c = yC(α)kC + yB(α)kB + s.
k j and Pj represent the demand and price of the asset at market j, Q is the price of cryptocurrency, and b is the
demand (quantity) for cryptocurrency. All prices are valued in terms of cash. Thus, the price of assets traded
in the B-market in terms of cryptocurrency is PB/Q. A risk-free saving option is denoted by s. The definition
of yj(α) is given by (2) below.
The constraints in the first line imply that the buyer allocates her cash endowment to the purchase of the
asset in the C-market and cryptocurrency, and the latter is used to buy the asset in the B-market. The purchase
amount in the B-market is limited by her holdings of cryptocurrency, as Assumption 1 suggests. As well, the
agent can stay inactive to get zero utility from her assets. The second line shows the consumption level, in
which, for j ∈ {B, C},
yj(α) ≡ p˜ijα ≡ [pij + (1− pij)φ]α, (2)
pij ≡ Pr(q = H in Market-j). (3)
11Another interpretation of θ is in light of consensus quality in Cong and He (2017). Although the distributed ledger makes a consensus
on the state close to perfect by aggregating the reports by system keepers, there is still noise and bias. We take a large θ as a precise
consensus. Also, Kroll, Davey and Felten (2013) consider a risk that the distributed ledger system goes wrong by group’s attempt to make
a consensus. It is also shown by Biais et al. (2018) that a folk of a chain generates two (or more) different consensuses. We capture these
events by θ < 1.
12We can incorporate insurance or third-party institutions that reduce the risk of lemons in the C-market, which typically exist in the real
economy. One possible way to describe them is by introducing a rejection probability θC in the C-market as well. A more parsimonious
way, which we follow, is to think of 1− pi as the fraction of low-quality assets that stay in the economy even after we ask third-party
institutions to reject them, i.e., the existing insurance cannot cover all the assets.
13As explained in the introduction, this assumption captures the class of cryptocurrencies that is used as a means of exchange in the
blockchain trading platform. The analyses in Subsection 4.4. provide a measure of the fundamental value of the blockchain, instead of
the value of the cryptocurrency, and hence does not need this assumption regarding CIA.
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Hence, yj represents the expected private return adjusted by the risk of lemons in market j, which is denoted
by 1− pij.
Because of the risk neutrality and linearity of y, splitting order into two markets is not optimal.14 Thus,
the demand always hits its upper limit (k j = 1), and the CIA constraint is binding. The expected return from
purchasing assets in each market (VB, VC) and that from staying inactive (V0) are given by
Vj(α) =
p˜ijα− Pj if j ∈ {B, C}0 if j = 0.
We subtract w from the equations above because it does not affect the equilibrium behavior.
To solve the venue-choice problem, we guess the following15:
PB
p˜iB
>
PC
p˜iC
,piB > piC, (4)
which will be shown to be a unique equilibrium. Intuitively, Pj/p˜ij is a normalized price and represents the
cutoff of α that generates indifference between buying in the j-market and staying inactive.16 It indicates
a positive measure of traders with relatively high (resp. low) α who wish to go to the B-market (resp. C-
market).17 Indeed, under (4), the optimal behavior of buyers with type α is determined by the cutoff α∗ such
that
α∗ ≡ PB − PC
p˜iB − p˜iC .
Figure 1 plots returns, Vi, against α and shows the cutoffs for the optimal behavior. Namely, it is optimal for
type α buyers to (i) buy one unit of the asset in the B-market if α ≥ α∗, (ii) in the C-market if α ∈ [ PCp˜iC , α∗), and
(iii) stay inactive otherwise.
Intuitively, each buyer faces a price-quality tradeoff, i.e., the B-market provides higher quality and expected
returns, but charges a higher price. Note that the gain from a higher pij is multiplied by α, while the cost is
constantly Pj. Hence, the B-market looks more attractive for high-α buyers.
Figure 1: Returns for Buyers
14Only the buyers on the threshold (defined below) can split the order, but we simplify our discussion by assuming a tie-breaking rule
that indifferent agents trade in the B-market.
15See Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2014) for a similar structure, in which they state these as assumptions, while we derive them endoge-
nously.
16Buyers’ behavior can be seen as the model of vertical differentiation, such as the one provided in Chapter 2 of Tirole (1988).
17If (4) does not hold, the B-market becomes too attractive to guarantee the coexistence.
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By aggregating along α, the total demand in each market is
KDj =
1− F(α
∗) for j = B,
F(α∗)− F
(
PC
p˜iC
)
for j = C.
(5)
The uniform F allows us to derive inverse demand functions:18
Pj =

(
1
p˜iC
+ 1∆p˜i
)−1 ( PB
∆p˜i − KDC
)
for j = C
PC + ∆p˜i(1− KDB ) for j = B,
(6)
with ∆p˜i ≡ p˜iB − p˜iC. Note that plugging in the aggregate supply KSj —which will be derived in the next
section—yields the equilibrium prices.
The price in one market affects the price in the other, and the quality difference, ∆p˜i, influences the prices
in the following way:
Lemma 1. With a fixed supply, a larger quality difference (∆pi) induces more traders to migrate from the C-market to
the B-market, leading to a lower PC and higher PB.
From the second equation, the price spread, ∆P ≡ PB − PC, stems from the quality difference. This can be
seen as a premium: The asset in the B-market obtains a higher valuation than the one in the C-market through
its higher quality, ∆p˜i. We derive the quality difference from supply-side behavior in the next subsection.
3.3. Optimal Behavior of Sellers: Endogenous Quality
As the literature on adverse selection assumes, each seller knows the quality of her asset.19 Also, note that each
seller does not engage in strategic trading: the signaling effect of venue choice is shunted aside because each
trader is non-atomic. Instead, the sell-side selection (screening) occurs due to θ > 0, even in the competitive
equilibrium.20
3.3.1. Low-Quality Sellers
First, we consider the optimal strategy of sellers with low-quality assets (L-type sellers). If a trader sells the
asset in the B-market, the expected return is
WLB = (1− θ)PB + θφα. (7)
The first term represents the case where the transaction avoids rejection, while the second is the case where
the asset is rejected by the blockchain. In the latter case, the trader must use the asset to get φα.21 On the other
18As for the form of F, the uniform assumption is restrictive in this model. The equilibrium is driven by the migration behavior of
agents. For example, if we make F bimodal, or if we only have two types of α, in the extremum case, the effect through the migration
is muted. By assuming uniformity, the fundamental effect of the blockchain platform and market structure are not altered by this slope-
effect (or drastic change in the extensive margin) of migration. This is the problem that commonly arises in the model of segmented
markets in which heterogeneous traders decide in which one to participate. See, for example, Zhu (2014) for a similar discussion.
19This structure can be generalized by assuming that the seller is informed with probability λ and uninformed with probability 1− λ.
An informed seller knows a specific characteristic of the asset and can distinguish lemons, while an uninformed agent cannot. We provide
the analyses in the generalized case with λ ∈ (0, 1) in Appendix B.
20Notice that, by setting the model in this way, we also implicitly exclude the possibility of collusion by sellers as in Cong and He
(2017). Since sellers are non-atomic, they expect that their behavior does not affect the market prices, quantity, or quality.
21The alternative assumption is allowing rejected traders to conduct “order routing.” A trader can first try to sell in the B-market and,
if rejected, can submit a sell order in the C-market. We can show that this alternative assumption does not change our main results,
including propositions 1, 2, and 4, though the equilibrium conditions are slightly modified. The results are available upon request.
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hand, if she sells it in the C-market, the return is WLC = PC , while the return from staying inactive is W
L
0 = φα.
See the left-hand panel of Figure 2 for a diagram of these value functions.
Figure 2: Returns for Sellers
By comparing these three returns as functions of α under (4), we see that the optimal strategy is to (i) stay
inactive if α > PBφ , (ii) sell in the B-market if α ∈ (αI , PBφ ], and (iii) sell in the C-market if α ≤ αI , where
αI = max
{
PC − (1− θ)PB
φθ
, 0
}
(8)
is the cutoff that separates sellers into the B- and C-markets.
When it is strictly positive, the cutoff αI is increasing in θ, decreasing in φ, and increasing in the expected
price difference (numerator of αI). Given the prices, an increase in θ makes sellers who traded in the B-
market migrate to the C-market because a higher rejection probability lowers their expected profit. On the
other hand, a higher φ increases the continuation value and the profit from selling in the B-market, causing
marginal sellers to switch to this platform. Finally, a larger difference in the expected prices, PC − (1− θ)PB,
makes the C-market more attractive.
High-α sellers are more likely to trade lemons in the B-market, while low-α sellers tend to prefer the C-
market due to the price-liquidity tradeoff, i.e., the B-market provides a higher selling price, but at the risk
of rejection. High-α sellers do not care about the lower execution probability in the B-market because they
can obtain a high value of φα even if the selling order is rejected, while the opposite is true for their low-α
counterparts.
3.3.2. High-Quality Sellers
For a seller with a high-quality asset (H-type seller), the return from trading in the C-market, B-market, and
not trading are given by22
WHj =
Pj for j = B, C,α if j = 0.
Under the guess (4), the optimal behavior is to (i) stay inactive if α > PB and (ii) sell it in the B-market if
α ≤ PB. The right-hand panel of Figure 2 shows this comparison.
22More precisely, a seller who sells in the B-market obtains PB/Q of cryptocurrency, which amounts to PB in terms of cash value. We
implicitly assume that sellers have access to a dynamic market for cryptocurrency, in which they can trade it for fiat money at the same
exchange rate Q over time. This assumption is motivated by the overlapping generations of traders. The structure of these generations
is identical over time, and buyers in their young period arrive at the markets and demand cryptocurrency as a means of exchange.
Conversely, older sellers are ready to trade their cryptocurrency for fiat money.
10
Therefore, the amount of assets that sellers intend to sell in each market is
SB = piF(PB) + (1− pi)
[
F
(
PB
φ
)
− F (αI)
]
, (9)
SC = (1− pi)F (αI) . (10)
In (9), the first term is the supply from H-type sellers, and the second is that from L-type sellers. (10) only con-
sists of L-type selling behavior. As suggested by the literature on adverse selection with segmented markets
(Chen, 2012; Kim, 2012; Guerrieri and Shimer, 2014), a market with a low (high) price and deeper (shallower)
liquidity tends to attract low-quality (high-quality) assets because the different prices and liquidity can work
as a screening device.
Since the blockchain technology weeds out θ fraction of the lemons from the B-market, the supply functions
are given by
KSB = piF(PB) + (1− pi)(1− θ)
[
F
(
PB
φ
)
− F (αI)
]
, (11)
while, in the C-market, all of the selling attempts are accomplished, KSC = SC. As a result, the average quality
in each market is derived as follows:
Lemma 2. Endogenous market qualities are given by
pij =

piF(PB)
piF(PB)+(1−pi)(1−θ)
[
F
(
PB
φ
)
−F(αI)
] if j = B
0 if j = C.
(12)
Note that all of the high-quality assets go to the B-market since it provides a better price. In other words,
all of the assets traded in the C-market are of low quality. This arises from the information structure of sellers
(i.e., they all know the quality of their assets). In the real economy, it is not natural to claim that the C-market
contains only low-quality assets. Thus, in Appendix B, we redefine the equilibrium with uninformed sellers
to show that a more general information structure provides 0 < piC < piB < 1 in the equilibrium, while we
stick to our current formulation in the main model to extract clear intuitions.
3.4. Equilibrium Spreads
We can define the general equilibrium as follows:
Definition 2. The general equilibrium is defined by the price, quality, and quantity, (Q, {Pj,pij, Kj}j∈{C,B}),
that clear the markets (KSj = K
D
j ) with the following equations (under the normalization of BS = 1):
KSC = (1− pi)αI , KSB = piPB + (1− pi)(1− θ)
(
PB
φ
− αI
)
, (13)
KDB = 1−
PB − PC
p˜iB − φ , K
D
C =
PB − PC
p˜iB − φ −
PC
φ
,
piB =
piPB
KB
, Q = PBKiB.
The last equation is the clearing condition for the cryptocurrency market.
We can quantify the spreads in the price and quality between the two markets (see Appendix C1. for the
proofs).
Proposition 1. The blockchain market achieves a higher quality than the cash market, i.e., piB > piC.
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Proposition 1 has direct implications for the prices. That is, the positive spread in the quality, ∆pi > 0,
results in a higher price in the B-market as well.
Proposition 2. The price of assets traded in the B-market is higher than that in the traditional C-market, that is,
PB > PC.
This conclusion is consistent with the findings on the wine blockchain by the EY Advisory (see Section 5.),
in which wines sold on the blockchain platform attain a higher price.
Note that a higher θ affects piB via two channels. First, it exogenously precludes θ fraction of the lemons
as the second term in (13). Second, it generates the endogenous sorting of low-quality assets which manifests
in the change in the cutoff α caused by the fluctuation of Pj. This happens even if the sellers do not trade
strategically. Rather, the sell-side selection is a consequence of the purely competitive tradeoff between the
higher equilibrium price in the B-market and detection risk. Due to its higher continuation values, high-
quality assets tend to cluster in the B-market, while low-quality assets cluster in the C-market to avoid being
rejected. This mechanism generates a higher quality and price in the B-market (spreads), which are self-
sustaining in the equilibrium.23
4. Comparative Statics: The Effect of Security Improvement
For a technical reason, assume that the following condition holds:24 pi(1− pi)(1− φ) < 1/4.
4.1. Cash-Market Breakdown
Our first result regarding blockchain security seems rather drastic: the existence of this platform can com-
pletely destroy the activity of the cash market when the security level θ is sufficiently low. This appears
counterintuitive given the literature on “money versus credit,” which argues that a more sophisticated record-
keeping system makes cash inessential. Our result depends on whether θ becomes too low to sustain αI =
PC − (1− θ)PB > 0.25
Lemma 3. Let θ0 be the smaller solution of θ2(1− pi)− θ + pi(1− φ) = 0. (i) αI is positive if and only if θ > θ0. (ii)
θ0 is decreasing in φ and pi.
Proof. See Appendix C2. for the statement (i). (ii) follows immediately from the definition of θ0. 
Recall that αI is the cutoff for L-type sellers in the B-market (α ≥ αI) or in the C-market (α < αI). Therefore,
Lemma 3 and (13) imply the following:
Proposition 3. The C-market shuts down, KC = 0, when θ is smaller than θ0.
We denote the region ΘNC ≡ (0, θ0] as the no C-market region. The result comes from the supply side.
Remember that only L-type sellers trade their assets in the C-market. They wish to sell the asset at a higher
price PB, but they fear rejection. θ < θ0 makes the rejection risk sufficiently small that the price improvement
in the B-market becomes dominant. As a result, all the sellers migrate out of the C-market and try to sell in
the B-market. Of course, this induces a higher PC, but it is bounded and cannot explode due to the existence
23The economy is not continuous at θ = 0. When we make θ ↘ 0, it converges to the segmented markets economy with two homoge-
neous markets, which is different from an economy with only one (the C-market). For this reason, we do not compare the single-market
economy with the segmented economy. Rather, we focus on the comparative statics in the economy with segmented markets.
24This condition guarantees that the economy has both cases of αI > 0 and αI = 0.
25The term “cash-market breakdown” implies that all transactions that do not go through the blockchain disappear, but it does not
intend to indicate the disappearance of cash due to digital currency with no blockchain foundation, such as PayPal.
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of outside options (buying in the B-market or staying inactive). Also, the higher share of H assets in the
B-market always makes PB > PC even at the limit of KSC = 0, making the shutdown of the C-market an
equilibrium outcome.
We can determine the situations in which the C-market tends to be eliminated.
Corollary 1. A smaller φ and pi make the cash-market breakdown more likely, i.e., they make ΘNC larger.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 3. 
This result should also be intuitive if we recall that the critical θ is expressed as θ0 =
PB−PC
PB
. The lower φ
and pi mean that the underlying asymmetric information is severe, and both make buyers more eager to trade
in the B-market, leading to a larger spread, PB − PC. Then, sellers of low-quality assets are more willing to sell
in the B-market and are likely to abandon the traditional cash market.26
Of course, it is not realistic to anticipate that the real-world cash market will completely break down—we
do not believe that all grocery stores will use the blockchain to track information for all products. However,
our discussions can be viewed as the model of an exchange market for a particular class of assets (e.g., wine,
diamonds, art, and so on), for which the dominance of the blockchain platform can be more believable. This
also has implications for international trade, as transactions with a country that supplies an ambiguous quality
of goods would be completely done through the blockchain.27
4.2. Coexistence of Two Markets
In the following subsections, we let θ be sufficiently high, as we are interested in the interaction of two mar-
kets.28 We first investigate how PB and piB are differently affected by θ.
Proposition 4. (i) The segmented-markets economy admits a unique solution in which (ii) dPBdθ > 0,
dpiB
dθ > 0,
dPC
dθ < 0,
and dKBdθ < 0. Moreover, (iii) the price spread widens more than the quality spread, i.e.,
d∆P
dθ >
d∆pi
dθ .
Proof. See Appendix C3.. 
Consider an increase in θ. The supply of high-quality assets is not directly affected, as the first term of
KSB in (13) suggests. On the other hand, with a fixed PB, a higher θ reduces K
S
B by detecting and sweeping
out low-quality assets (the supply-side effect). Also, this improves the B-market’s quality, making participants
more willing to buy in B-market, which increases KDB (the demand-side effect).
How does PB change compared to the quality, piB? The small supply and strong demand pressure both
work to increase the price, i.e., it is pushed up by both the demand- and supply-side effects. On the other
hand, the quality improvement is linked only with the decline in the supply. Crucially, this implies that the
growth in the price is larger than the quality improvement, making the trading demand in B-market smaller.
This result has direct implications for the next results.
26Technically, we can avoid this by considering the general model with λ < 1, by restricting our focus on θ ≥ θ0, and by modifying the
model according to the discussion in note 21.
27Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 indicate that the shutdown occurs when (i) the introduced blockchain is immature in the sense of
θ ≤ θ0, and (ii) agents suffers from severe asymmetric information. If we consider the micro-foundation of θ in Appendix A, situation (i)
can happen when the total number of intermediations between producers and buyers is large and covering all the steps using blockchain
transactions is more difficult, as exemplified by international trade in the real world. Note that a longer intermediation chain also induces
more severe information asymmetry, which implies that (i) and (ii) may ensure simultaneously.
28We believe that a sufficiently high θ that sustains the coexisting B- and C-markets is realistic given the discussion in the introduction.
Arguments for θ ≤ θ0 are provided in Appendix C2..
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4.3. Non-Monotonic Effects of Blockchain Sophistication
Our primary concern is whether the sophistication of the blockchain, measured by θ, increases the transaction
value in the platform, the price of cryptocurrency, the value of the blockchain itself, and consumers’ welfare.
It turns out that a rise in θ has non-monotonic effects on these variables. Specifically, a higher θ is more likely
to lower these variables when information asymmetry is not severe, or the level of θ is sufficiently small.
First, we formally state the results regarding the trading value and Q in the sequel. We will offer intuitions
and key mechanisms behind the results when we investigate the value of the blockchain and consumers’
welfare in the next subsection, because all of these variables are driven by the same factors.
4.3.1. Trading Value and the Price of Cryptocurrency
The market clearing condition gives Q = PB
∫
kDB dF(α) = PBKB (with BS = 1, which makes no difference in
our analyses). Let φ1 = 2−pi3−pi , and φ0(< φ1) be the unique solution of (38) in Appendix C3..
Proposition 5. (i) If φ < φ0, Q and PBKB are monotonically increasing in θ. (ii) If φ0 ≤ φ < φ1, Q and PBKB are
U-shaped, and there is θ∗ s.t.,
dQ
dθ
=
dPBKB
dθ
≶ 0⇔ θ ≶ θ∗.
(iii) If φ1 ≤ φ ≤ 1, Q and PBKB are monotonically decreasing in θ.
Proof. See Appendix C3.. 
The proposition indicates that the trading value and the price of cryptocurrency exhibit a non-monotonic
reaction to the sophistication of the blockchain technology.
This finding differentiates our theory from the literature on money versus credit, in which the increase in
record-keeping ability tends to make cash inessential. As we will see in the next subsection, endogenous price
and quality spreads, which are absent in the literature, are the key factors that prompt this result.
4.4. Fundamental Value of the Blockchain and Welfare Impact
In this subsection, we calculate the aggregate welfare of buyers (see Appendix D3. for sellers’ welfare), as well
as the welfare gain from access to the blockchain platform.29
4.4.1. Buyers’ Welfare
We define the aggregate welfare of buyers by integrating the gain from trade (we ignore the common constant
endowment w):
vB =
∫
α∗
(p˜iBα− PB)dF +
∫ α∗
PC/φ
(φα− PC)dF (14)
=
∫
α∗
(∆p˜iα− ∆P)dF︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
∝PBKB=Q
+
∫
PC/φ
(φα− PC)dF (15)
In equation (14), the first term is the welfare of buyers who purchase in the B-market, and the second encom-
passes those who purchase in the C-market. This can be rewritten by using “welfare gain” and “reservation
welfare” as in (15). The second term of (15) represents the welfare of all the active buyers from purchasing in
29Technically, as the CIA constraint always binds, the welfare comparison does not hinge on the existence of cryptocurrency. More gen-
erally, the equilibrium variables with and without the CIA constraint are identical except for the formula for Q because of the “monetary
neutrality” of cryptocurrency.
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the C-market, i.e., the reservation welfare when agents can use only this venue. The first term of (15) is the
gain (increment) in welfare that stems from changing the trading platform from C to B, which only α ≥ α∗
agents attempt to do. Interestingly, the welfare gain is co-linear with the trading value in the B-market in the
benchmark model (see Appendix D1.). If the blockchain platform has cryptocurrency, it further implies that
the welfare gain is measured by Q. The effect of θ on vB is analyzed later.
4.4.2. Fundamental Value of the Blockchain Technology
The first term of equation (15) shows that access to the blockchain technology attains a positive fundamental
price. To see this, we introduce a monopolistic blockchain manager who maintains the platform and determines
the level of θ. The existence of this type of agent is realistic: even though the distributed ledger is managed by
the participants of the network, there is an institution that provides the exchange platform itself.30
We discuss the buy-side problem by assuming that consumers must pay a fee to use the blockchain.31 Let
us introduce a pre-trade period t = −1 and suppose that a randomly picked buyer is approached by the
blockchain manager (called the “manager,” hereafter), who charges a fee fB for access to the B-market before
the type α is drawn at t = 0.32 Note that the behavior of this particular agent does not affect the expected
market result because she is non-atomic. Also, there is no bargaining, the offer is one shot, and take-it-or-
leave-it.
If the buyer declines the contract, her expected welfare stays at the reservation level in (15), which we
denote as
v0 =
∫
PC
φ
(φα− PC)dF, (16)
while access to the blockchain platform provides a welfare (after the fee) of vB − fB. Thus, the amount of the
fee that makes her indifferent is33
fB = ∆vB ≡ vB − v0 =
∫
α∗
(∆p˜iα− ∆P)dF. (17)
In other words, the blockchain manager can charge a fee up to the amount of the welfare gain given by (17).
We can see this amount as the “price” of the blockchain technology or platform, since traders are willing to
“buy” the right to participate in the B-market at the price of fB. Moreover, we have the following intuitive
result.
Proposition 6. The fundamental price of the blockchain is perfectly correlated with the trading value in the B-market
and the price of cryptocurrency Q if the CIA constraint is assumed:
fB =
pi(1− φ)
2
KBPB =
pi(1− φ)
2
Q. (18)
Proof. See equation (39) in Appendix D1.. 
Corollary 2. The sophistication of the blockchain technology has the same impact on fB as proposed by Proposition 5.
30The assumption that the manager is a monopolist is also realistic at this point, provided that we have a limited number of blockchain
firms for each product. For example, as of February 2018, HyperLedger is the single leading firm that provides a platform for security
trading by using the blockchain.
31We discuss on the fee imposed on the sell side in Appendix F1..
32Another way to think about the price of the blockchain is to conceptualize fB as contingent on the usage of the B-market. In this case,
the profit of buying in the B-market is shifted down by fB only if a trader decides to participate. This formulation, however, generates
complicated equilibrium conditions because it changes the cutoff of each trader. To avoid complications, we focus on a setting with the
ex-ante contract.
33We assume the tie-breaking rule so that an agent accepts the contract with the blockchain manager if she is indifferent.
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This proposition suggests that, if the blockchain uses cryptocurrency, the fundamental value of the tech-
nology is perfectly reflected by the price of cryptocurrency. In other words, the price of both cryptocurrency
and the blockchain entirely depends on how active the transactions in the B-market are, which is measured
by the trading value.34
4.5. Intuitions and Mechanism
The intuition behind the non-monotonic reaction of Q = PBKB ∝ fB put forward by Proposition 5 and Corollary
2 is given by the behavior of PB and KB, together with the migration of buyers.
First, when θ increases, we find that a more secure blockchain technology tends to widen both price and
quality spreads, ∆P and ∆pi. The former reduces the demand in the B-market, while the latter increases it, i.e.,
the B-market guarantees a higher quality but becomes exclusive. Second, the formula Q = PBKB ∝ fB implies
that Q and fB rise when PB increases more than KB declines. Rewriting the derivative of Q by using elasticity
makes this clearer. Since KB can be expressed as a function of PB (without θ), and PB is monotonic regarding
θ, we have
d fB
dθ
∝
dQ
dθ
= (1− εPK)KB dPBdθ
with
εPK ≡ −dKB/dPBKB/PB .
εPK is the price elasticity of the B-market transaction volume. Thus, if the price elasticity of demand is high, a
decline in KB dominates the increase in PB, leading to a smaller Q and fB. To understand the determinants of
εPK, recall that the buyers’ venue choice is driven by how easily they can migrate to the C-market to avoid a
higher PB.
When φ is sufficiently large, asymmetric information is not severe because the difference between the two
asset types is small. Then, buyers are not eager to have H-type assets and are not attracted to a high piB in the
B-market. Thus, a marginal increase in PB leads to a larger decline in KB, and the transaction activity in the
B-market, measured by the transaction value, KBPB, diminishes. Hence, the price of the blockchain platform
and cryptocurrency drops. If φ is small, it becomes difficult for consumers to migrate away to the C-market,
leading to an increase in PBKB, Q, and fB.
If φ is intermediate, the level of θ matters because it determines the difference between the two markets,
∆pi. If θ is small, so is ∆pi: the difference in buying in the B-market and C-markets is not significant in terms of
the probability of purchasing low-quality assets. This facilitates migration to the C-market, since this market
provides a lower price, while the difference in quality is negligible. This leads to a decline in KB more than an
increase in PB, lowering Q and fB. If θ is large, the B-market provides a significantly higher average quality,
i.e., the quality spread is large, and Q and fB increase with θ.
The bottom line is that, depending on the underlying information asymmetry, the change in the market
structure has a different impact on the market activity. Specifically, even if the blockchain technology could
reduce asymmetric information, it does not always make this market attractive for consumers and may even
dampen its trading value.
34Moreover, the price of the blockchain technology is multiplied by the coefficient pi(1− φ)/2. This value is the multiplier of ∆p˜i: when
the quality difference is large, the gain from trading in the B-market rather than the C-market is high. When asymmetric information
is not severe (φ is high) or the economy-wide share of low-quality assets is large (pi is small), the price of cryptocurrency magnifies the
fundamental value of the blockchain technology or the welfare gain for buyers (and vice versa).
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4.6. Optimal θ and Welfare Distortion
Now, we seek to determine the optimal level of θ from the perspective of traders’ welfare and the blockchain
manager. Suppose that the manager tries to maximize her fee revenue from the buy side of the market, fB.35
The analogous discussion on fee maximization when it is imposed on sellers is provided in Appendix F1..
In this subsection, we compare the maximization of the fee by the manager to the maximization of buyers’
aggregate welfare, which may be performed by a social planner, e.g., FinTech regulation (or promotion) by the
government. Note that the choice of the objective function is highly arbitrary. However, the evidence from the
wine blockchain by the EY Advisory suggests that the platform imposes a fee on the buy side of the market.
First, θ has the following impact on the aggregate consumers’ welfare vB:
Proposition 7. (i) dv0dθ > 0. (ii-1) When pi > 1/2,
dvB
dθ > 0.
(ii-2) When pi ≤ 1/2, there is a unique φ2. If φ < φ2, then dvBdθ > 0. Otherwise, there is a unique θ∗∗ ∈ (0, 1] such that
dvB
dθ
≷ 0⇔ θ ≷ θ∗∗.
Proof. See Appendix D1.. 
Together with Q and fB, buyers’ welfare also has a U-shaped trajectory for a certain set of parameters. The
reservation welfare is monotonically increasing in θ because a higher θ lowers PC more than it decreases piC
due to the same mechanism as in Proposition 4-(iii).
The remaining part of vB, which perfectly correlates with PBKB, generates non-monotonicity in vB by the
same mechanism as mentioned in Subsection 4.5..
Moreover, the result depends on pi. When pi is relatively high, the marginal increase in the fraction of assets
rejected by the blockchain, (1− pi)θ, is small. That is, innovation does not cause a large quality improvement
or a huge reduction of KSB since the economy does not have a significant amount of low-quality assets to begin
with. The increment in PB caused by the higher θ is not significant enough to confound the demand in the
B-market, and the welfare gain represented by the first term in (15) stays high.
4.6.1. Optimal θ for the Platform Manager
By looking at (15) and (17), we notice that the objective functions of the blockchain manager and the social
planner are different, as the manager does not care about the reservation welfare, v0. From (16), we also
know that a higher θ monotonically increases v0 by lowering the price in the C-market. Thus, the manager
undervalues the marginal benefit of increasing θ compared to buyers’ total welfare.
Formally, let θ∗M = arg maxθ∈[θ0,1] fB(θ) and θ
∗
V = arg maxθ∈[θ0,1] vB(θ), which represent the levels of θ that
maximize the fee and buyers welfare, respectively. Even though it is difficult to analytically determine vB(θ =
1) ≷ vB(θ = θ0), it is obvious that θ∗M , θ∗V when fB is monotonically decreasing and vB is monotonically
increasing.
Proposition 8. If {pi > 12 and φ ∈ [φ1, 1]} or {pi ≤ 12 and φ ∈ [φ1, φ2]}, then θ0 = θ∗M < θ∗V = 1. If {φ < φ0 and
pi > 12} or {pi ≤ 12 and φ < φ2}, then θ∗M = θ∗V = 1.
Proposition 8 tells us that, depending on the parameters, welfare loss arises from the conflicting objectives
of the manager and the government. The numerical results are shown in Figure 3 when fB or vB has a U-
shaped curve.
35The previous subsection assumes that only one buyer is offered the contract. Even if the entire set of buyers is offered it, maximizing
f is still optimal since the measure of buyers is one and they are ex-ante identical.
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Figure 3: Fee Revenue and Buyers’ Welfare
This highlights an interesting implication. If the underlying asymmetric information is mild (φ is high),
as in the left and middle panels, the marginal increase in θ tends to dampen the activity in the B-market.
This results in a lower welfare gain in the B-market and reduces the fee revenue for the manager. Thus,
the manager prefers to keep θ low (θ = θ0). The social planner, however, knows that a higher θ boosts the
reservation welfare, and this increment can compensate for losses in the B-market when φ is relatively high.
The level of θ that maximizes buyers’ welfare is therefore θ = 1. Thus, the blockchain platform operated by the
manager is under-secured in the sense that the reduction of asymmetric information is not enough to achieve
the maximum vB.
On the other hand, when asymmetric information is relatively severe, as in the right panel, a higher θ
facilitates activity in the B-market because PB increases more than KB declines. In this case, the fee revenue
positively responds to a higher θ, and so does vB. Therefore, the blockchain market operated by the manager
can maximize buyers’ welfare.
The literature on strategic management, such as Teece (1986) and Brandenburger and Stuart Jr (1996),
suggests that a firm does not fully adopt innovation, although it creates value for consumers. This is because
a firm cannot extract full welfare gain of consumers generated by innovation. We show that this issue arises
in the blockchain technology as well, since the manager cannot extract the value in the traditional C-market
created by the blockchain technology.
4.6.2. Government Intervention
The preceding discussion indicates that the blockchain manager values an increment in θ as highly as the
social planner only if the price elasticity of the demand is small, i.e., a higher θ boosts the trading value in
the B-market. This coincidence tends to occur when the underlying information problem is severe because it
imposes a higher cost on the migration of buyers. If the market is closer to complete in terms of φ or ∆pi, the
manager prefers a lower θ than the socially optimal level since she dislikes a decline in the transaction value
in the B-market that is caused by the small cost of changing trading platforms.
This implies that the government should intervene in the intermediation chain to facilitate transactions
through the blockchain and to increase θ when the traded goods suffer from non-severe asymmetric infor-
mation. In contrast, it should remain neutral when the information problem is severe since the manager
voluntarily maximizes consumers’ welfare. This runs counter to the traditional views on government inter-
vention in markets with adverse selection (e.g., OTC markets after the recent financial crisis), which believe
the government should meddle when adverse selection is more severe to avoid market breakdowns.
Our conclusion is driven by the fact that asymmetric information arises among agents, while the platform
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manager, who has a tool to mitigate the problem, is interested only in the fee revenue from a certain part of
the market. The government does not have a tool to detect the lemons and must rely on the technological
innovation in our model that may different from the situation in which it intervened in OTC markets.
5. Empirical Implications
We can derive several empirical inferences regarding the fundamental value of cryptocurrency and the blockchain
and their comparative statics. If we take the model with a CIA constraint, we get the following arguments.
(i) The asset price in the blockchain platform is higher than that in the cash market (Proposition 2). (ii) As the
blockchain system becomes secure, the asset price in the blockchain platform (resp. cash market) increases
(resp. decreases) as in Proposition 4. (iii) For the same situation, the trading value in the blockchain platform
and the cryptocurrency price increase if the asymmetric information is severe, while it declines otherwise
(Proposition 5).
If we have a dataset that contains the transaction price in a market with the blockchain technology, smart
contracts, and cryptocurrency, we can test implication (i) by comparing this price to that in the traditional
market. In addition, if we have data from the scratch of the transaction system, we can keep track of the price
in the blockchain market and the corresponding price in the traditional market to verify implication (ii).
Implication (iii) is striking: improvements in the blockchain security system do not necessarily increase the
trading value and demand for cryptocurrency. On the one hand, this implies that enhancement in blockchain
security does not have a robust testable implication. On the other hand, with a dataset and a sufficient exoge-
nous change in θ, our model provides a new measure for the degree of asymmetric information and adverse
selection by analyzing how θ affects the transaction value in the B-market.
Additionally, considering the welfare results in Subsection 4.4., the value of the blockchain system is pro-
portional to the fundamental price of cryptocurrency (Proposition 6). This has several applications. First, if we
have data that measure the value of the blockchain defined in Subsection 4.4.2. (e.g. ex-ante entrance fee in the
B-market) and the cryptocurrency price therein, we can directly test the implications of (18). Second, even if
transactions are not done using cryptocurrency, Proposition 6 tells us how we can predict the welfare-relevant
performance of the blockchain platform.
Since, as of the date of this study, the application of the blockchain in state-contingent transactions is still
in its initial stages, we will empirically evaluate these implications in future projects. As the first step, a quali-
tative finding consistent with our theoretical model arises from the introduction of the blockchain in the wine
supply chain. A consulting firm, EY Advisory & Consulting Co. Ltd. (EY), pioneered the blockchain-based
administration of the quality of each step of the production of wine, such as grape harvesting, fermentation
and bottling, wholesaling, and retail. From talks with corresponding consultants, we confirm that the aim of
introducing the technology is to enhance the satisfaction of both customers and suppliers, by guaranteeing the
products quality.
Information on the wine blockchain was kindly shared by EY Japan. It reveals the financial results of two
clients in 2018. One client’s retail price per bottle increased from 7.00 to 9.20 Euros, whereas other’s increased
from 7.00 to 7.46 Euros. Under the assumption that the underlying trend of wine prices is constant, this
finding is consistent with empirical prediction (i). The report also contains information on the investment
and ROI, which ware 53,000 Euros and 7.92%, and 113,000 Euros and 13.94%, respectively. These numbers do
not include the value of improving business efficacy due to the blockchain, such as digitalization and more
efficient management. In sum, investment in the blockchain generates positive return for the client firms.
19
6. Conclusion
We develop a simple model to analyze some economic implications of the blockchain technology as a new
transaction platform. Following the notion of the smart contract, we consider the blockchain protocol as a way
to mitigate asymmetric information and investigate the effect of technological sophistication (innovation) on
the economy.
Firstly, the blockchain as a platform causes the segmentation of the trading venues and the differentiation
of both sides of the markets (buyers and sellers). We consider asymmetric information among the agents and
show that the segmentation and differentiation endogenously generate spreads in the price and quality of the
assets traded in segmented markets.
We find that the sophistication and innovation of the blockchain have non-monotonic effects on the trading
value in the blockchain, the fundamental value of the platform, the price of cryptocurrency, and consumers’
welfare. That is, innovation does not necessarily increase the value of the blockchain and consumers’ welfare.
This is because a more sophisticated blockchain attracts high-quality assets and boosts their price. Since the
price increases more than the quality, the blockchain platform becomes “an exclusive market.” When the
underlying asymmetric information is not severe, innovation makes a large number of consumers migrate
away from the blockchain platform to the traditional one, because they are willing to accept lower-quality
assets to save a price cost.
The non-monotonicity leads to a welfare loss when a platform manager, who competes with the traditional
market, controls the level of innovation. Since a very sophisticated blockchain platform is not attractive for
most consumers, the platform cannot charge a high access fee. Thus, the manager has an incentive to keep the
innovation level lower than the first best.
A few issues, such as empirical implications, cannot be investigated well without the availability of further
data. Nonetheless, this model proposes the first theoretical framework to study the measurable outcomes of
new digital innovations. In addition, one possible future project is the extension of this framework into a
dynamic setup. Specifically, this model can be modified to analyze a structure of overlapping generations and
time-varying stochastic dividends of the assets, as per the previous literature. Together with the blockchain
mechanism, the supply function of cryptocurrency is another salient difference of the blockchain from tradi-
tional cash, as Schilling and Uhlig (2018) point out, and incorporating both of these factors provides a more
comprehensive pricing theory for cryptocurrency.
Even though the blockchain technology and cryptocurrency are still in their nascent and pivot around
speculation, their influence is growing and their potential applications are being vigorously sought. There-
fore, we believe that the analyses of their fundamental effects in our theoretical model will have important
implications not only for financial markets, but also for the entire economy.
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A Appendix: Motivating Examples for θ
Smart Contract: Reduction in Asymmetric Information
Consider an agent who wants to purchase a good (say, a box of wines). A value of the wine for the consumer
depends on multiple dimensions of state, S = (s1, s2, · · · , sN). We can think of them as a brand of grape,
a producer, vintage, storage conditions, and so on. There are N-steps of intermediations between a wine
producer and consumer, and each step is operated by an anonymous intermediary whose type is either H or
L (see Figure 4). The state sj denotes the type of the intermediary and takes two values, sj ∈ {sH , sL}, with
Pr(sj = sH) = p.
We simplify the arguments by assuming that the consumer’s private value of the good is positive if, and
only if, all the states are high, S = SH ≡ (sH1 , sH2 , · · · , sHN). Otherwise, the good is valueless. Each intermediary
is rewarded equally only if the good is sold.36
To describe asymmetric information about the quality of the good, suppose that a “label” of the wine tells
only an announced states sˆ alleged by intermediaries, and the true state is not verifiable: the consumer gets to
see only Sˆ = (sˆ1, · · · , sˆN). Since the consumer’s private value is positive only if S = SH , announcing sˆj = sH is
optimal for all j, which results in Sˆ = SH .37 This describes a typical situation in which a consumer is devoid of
a comprehensive knowledge to value a good—it is hard to identify the quality of a wine before she purchases
and drinks it.38 This is represented by the first row of intermediations in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Intermediation by Cash and Blockchain
Now, we introduce the blockchain protocol (the second row of intermediations in Figure 4). If the transac-
tion at step j is consummated through the blockchain, then the announced state sˆj is supposed to be credible,
i.e., sˆj = sj, and the scripts on Ethereum make transactions take place only if all the past states are H.
We define θˆ as the fraction of intermediations that adopt blockchain transaction, and θ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] as the
fraction of low-quality goods rejected in the intermediations chain (as a function of θˆ). Define pi(θˆ) ≡ Pr(S = SH |θˆ).39
If there is no transaction conducted by the blockchain, we have pi(0) = pN ≡ pi, and 1− pi fraction of
the goods in the retail store (step N) are of low-quality. We see this as a benchmark, in which only traditional
means of transaction is used. Now, suppose that 0 < M ≤ N steps of intermediations are conducted by the
blockchain technology; θˆ = MN .
40 Then, the resulting probability of the high-quality goods in the retail store is
36Rewards do not have to be specified in this example. Any positive rewards, such as private value and monetary payoff, contingent
on the purchase of goods by buyers generate the same results.
37If the good contains sL for some step-j, the consumer does not buy the product from the intermediary-N (i.e., a retailer). Then, if
sˆj = sH , ∀j ≤ N − 1, it is optimal for the retailer to announce sH and sell it at her store. On the other hand, if there is some j ≤ N − 1 who
announced sL, then the retailer does not accept the goods knowing that she cannot sell them to the consumer. By taking this argument
backward, we can say that the all goods sold by the retailer have the same label with Sˆ = SH .
38Adopting these arguments into Bitcoin blockchain is easy; The traded asset is bitcoin itself, state sj represents the balance of bitcoin on
traders’ accounts at date t = j, and traders may have a transaction or liquidity shock (state) in each period, which determines the state in
the current period. For instance, st is either “spent x amount of coin (st = st−1 − x)” or “earn additional y amount of coin (st = st−1 + y)”
with some probability.
39A set of information also includes Sˆ, but this does not convey any information since all of the intermediaries have an incentive to
announce the high state regardless of their true types.
40Since we set pj = p, we can assume, without loss of generality, that first M steps are executed through blockchain.
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pi(θˆ) = pN−M. By the definition of θ, this can be expressed in terms of θ:
pi(θˆ) =
pi
pi + (1− θ)(1− pi) ,
which is the probability of the high-quality goods conditional on the goods are sold in the retail store after θ
fraction of low-quality goods are rejected. By equating these two expressions, we can rewrite θ as a monoton-
ically increasing function of θˆ:
θ =
1− pNθˆ
1− pN ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, in this discussion, as the number of transactions founded on blockchain technology (θˆ) increases, the
probability of rejecting low-quality goods (θ) monotonically increases.
In the main model, we use θ as a metric of the blockchain security, i.e., the power of the blockchain tech-
nology to reduce the economy wide asymmetric information. In other words, we can think of this example
as a micro-foundation of θ in the main model by making the step-N retailer the “sellers.” In Appendix E, we
adopt this architecture into some real-world examples: Bitcoin and Ethereum. It also provides examples of
blockchain platforms not associated with circulation of cryptocurrency.
Time-Consuming Transactions
One of the most salient benefits of state-contingent transactions manifests itself in international trade or re-
mittance. It is well known that it takes a huge cost and time to settle international trade of goods because
it involves mostly manual paper works, authorization of banks in both countries, and jurisdiction problems.
This also applies to the international remittance in which we need to authenticate bank accounts of both par-
ties.
We can describe this situation by using the example above. Suppose that Alice in California wishes to
send money to Bob in Africa, while there is a chance that Bob’s account is not authentic and he may run away
without sending back money or goods. The start of the chain (j = 0) is Bob who is either a good or bad agent
(bank account is authentic or not), and all other intermediaries (j = 2 ∼ N, say banks) try to verify that Bob at
j = 0 is authentic.
For banks, verification may take a long time or even impossible (sj = L) with probability 1− p. Alice is
in need of immediacy, and S , SH takes a toll due to a delay cost. If the transaction is conducted by Bitcoin,
however, it can be dramatically secure because of the above-mentioned mechanism and no longer takes a long
time (it makes sj = sH). We can interpret θˆ as a fraction of transactions that introduce the blockchain and
reduce the time for verification. Then, it reduces the possibility of delay by θ, making the trade more efficient.
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Online Appendix
B Online Appendix: Generalized Model with Uninformed Sellers
Consider the same structure as in the main model. In addition, assume that a seller is informed with prob-
ability λ and uninformed with probability 1 − λ. If one is informed, she knows a specific characteristic of
high-quality assets and can distinguish the lemons, while uninformed agents cannot tell the difference.41 The
optimal behavior of informed sellers is same as the main model.
B1. Optimal Behavior of Uninformed Sellers
Behavior of an uninformed seller is determined by comparing the following returns:
WU0 = (pi + φ(1− pi))α,
WUC = PC,
WUB = (pi + (1− pi)(1− θ))PB + (1− pi)θφα. (19)
The first one is the return from consuming her own asset, the second one is the return from selling in the
C-market, and the last one is the return from selling in the B-market. In the last case, she obtains PB if the
transaction is completed, while she ends up consuming her asset if her order is rejected. The two coefficients
in (19) represent the probability of successful trade and rejection. Let
p˜i ≡ pi + φ(1− φ),pi0 ≡ pi + (1− pi)(1− θ)
and define a parameter
ξ ≡ pi + (1− pi)(1− θ)
pi + φ(1− pi)(1− θ) p˜i.
The behavior of uninformed sellers is similar to those of informed sellers with low-quality assets since both
of them fear the risk of detection. As we can see from (19), however, the return from selling in the B-market,
WUB , is lower than that of informed sellers, WB in (7), because the return is discounted by the probability that
her asset is of low-quality. On the other hand, the return from selling in the C-market is not affected by this.
Namely, with 100% probability, they can sell the asset of unknown quality. As a consequences, once again, it
becomes a price-liquidity tradeoff given the expected continuation value of the asset, which makes relatively
low(resp. high)-α sellers trade assets in the C-market (resp. B-market).
Sufficiently low price in the B-market
Therefore, if the price in B-market is sufficiently low (ξPB ≤ PC), trading in the B-market is not optimal: they
try to sell in the C-market or stay inactive. Hence, there is a unique threshold
αU =
Pc
p˜i
.
This separates sellers who go to the C-market and stay inactive. The amount of sell orders from uninformed
sellers is
SUB = 0,
SUC = (1− λ)F
(
PC
p˜i
)
,
and it directly corresponds to the supply amount: KUj = S
U
j .
41In this case, assume, for simplicity, that the realization of α is independent of the realization of being informed or uninformed.
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Sufficiently high price in the B-market
On the other hand, if the price in the B-market is sufficiently high, ξPB > PC, the uninformed sellers use both
of the two markets because the higher price in the B-market strictly outweighs the risk of holding lemons for
high-α sellers. That is, there are two thresholds,
αU0 =
PC − pi0PB
φθ(1− pi) , α
U
1 =
pi0
pi + φ(1− pi)(1− θ)PB,
which separate uninformed sellers into three groups. As in the case of informed sellers of low-quality assets,
uninformed sellers (i) sell in the C-market if α ≤ αU0 , (ii) in the B-market if α ∈ (αU0 , αU1 ], and (iii) stay inactive
otherwise. Hence, the amount of sell orders from uninformed traders is
SUB = (1− λ)[F(αU1 )− F(αU0 )],
SUC = (1− λ)F(αU0 ),
and the supply after the screening by the blockchain is
KUB = (1− λ)pi0[F(αU1 )− F(αU0 )],
KUC = (1− λ)F(αU0 ).
B2. Aggregate Supply and Market Quality
The supply functions in the previous subsections determine the aggregate supply, KSB and K
S
C, as well as the
market quality, piB and piC. Let χ be an indicator function for ξPB > PC, i.e., χ = I{ξPB>PC}. The aggregate
supply sums up the supply from both types of sellers:
KSC = λ(1− pi)F (αI) + (1− λ)
[
χF(αU0 ) + (1− χ)F
(
PC
p˜i
)]
(20)
KSB = λ
{
piF(PB) + (1− pi)(1− θ)
[
F
(
PB
φ
)
− F (αI)
]}
(21)
+ (1− λ)pi0χ[F(αU1 )− F(αU0 )].
By using these equations, we can derive the average quality in both markets:
piC =
(1− λ)pi
[
χF(αU0 ) + (1− χ)F
(
PC
p˜i
)]
KSC
(22)
piB =
λpiF(PB) + (1− λ)piχ[F(αU1 )− F(αU0 )]
KSB
. (23)
The determination of Q is the same as before.
B3. Numerical Examples for the General Model
Figure 5 plots the effect of θ on the economic variables when asymmetric information is not severe (φ = 0.7).42
As we have anticipated, the improvement of the blockchain security brings about the higher price PB and
quality piB in the B-market. However, the direct rejection of θ fraction of low-quality assets, as well as the
higher price, will have a negative effect on the total trading volume in B-market and Q. The intuition is the
same as in the main model proposed in subsection 4.5..
As asymmetric information becomes more severe (φ = 0.5), it becomes more costly for buyers to switch
to the C-market. Figure 6 provides effects of improvement in the blockchain technology. When θ is small, the
difference between piB and piC is minimal. Thus, accepting a higher price in B-market is perceived as more
costly than improvement of the average quality. Therefore, a marginal increase in θ wipes out more traders
than it attracts, leading to a larger decline in the trading volume in the B-market than the increase in PB. The
resulting Q is, therefore, downward sloping.
42Parameter values for the numerical examples are given by λ = 1 and pi = 0.3.
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In contrast, when θ is high, the quality spread, ∆pi, becomes significant. Although a higher θ induces a
higher price PB, this does not trigger a large migration since buyers try to avoid the significant uncertainty in
the C-market. In this case, the increment in the price dominates the decline in the transaction volume in the
B-market, making the transaction value, PBKB, and the cryptocurrency price, Q, increasing in θ.
Figure 5: φ = 0.7
Figure 6: φ = 0.5
C Online Appendix : Proof
C1. Proof for Proposition 1 and 2
The following argument proves the claim under the generalized model with λ ∈ [0, 1] whose equilibrium
conditions are provided in Appendix B. Making λ = 1 proves the proposition for the benchmark model.
Our arguments start from two conditions. In the buyers’ problem, our guesses are
PBp˜iC > PCp˜iB (24)
3
and
piB > piC. (25)
Given these, the buyers’ partial equilibrium implies that
PB
p˜iB
− PC
p˜iC
= (1− K) + (p˜iB − p˜iC)KC − (1− K) > 0,
where K = KB + KC. Therefore, we have shown that the inequality (24) holds in the equilibrium as long as the
guess (25) is correct (note that (25) and p˜iB > p˜iC are equivalent).
As the next step, we obtain piB and piC in the general equilibrium under the guess (25) (and (24)). By letting
∆pi ≡ piB − piC and F be uniform, we have
∆pi =
pi
KBKC
[
L− λ(1− λ)(1− pi)(1− θ)βU0
∆P
φθ
]
(26)
where ∆P = PB − PC and
L = λ(1− pi)αI(PB + βU1 ) + (1− λ)βU0 (λ(1− pi)PB + (1− λ)(1− pi0)βU1 ),
βU0 =
PC
p˜i
+ χ
(
αU0 −
PC
p˜i
)
, βU1 = χ(α
U
1 − αU0 ).
Since both of αU0 − PC/p˜i and αU1 − αU0 are (positively) proportional to ξPB − PC, we have βU0 > 0 and βU1 ≥ 0.
Therefore, L > 0. Moreover, from (6), the difference in prices is
∆P = (p˜iB − p˜iC)(1− KB) = (1− KB)(1− φ)∆pi, (27)
where we obviously have KB < 1. By plugging this into (26), we obtain
∆pi =
pi
KBKC
[
L− λ(1− λ)(1− pi)(1− θ)βU0
(1− KB)(1− φ)
φθ
∆pi
]
∴ ∆pi =
pi
KBKC
L
1+ piKBKC λ(1− λ)(1− pi)(1− θ)βU0
(1−KB)(1−φ)
φθ
> 0.
Thus, the guess (25) holds in the general equilibrium, and (27) implies PB > PC.
C2. Proof for Proposition 3
Suppose that we have αI > 0. Then the equilibrium solves
KSC = (1− pi)
PC − (1− θ)PB
θφ
, KSB = piPB + (1− pi)(1− θ)
(
PB − PC
φθ
)
, (28)
KDB = 1−
PB − PC
(1− φ)piB , K
D
C =
PB − PC
(1− φ)piB −
PC
φ
,
piB =
piPB
KB
.
Let S = (PB − PC)/PB be the normalized spread across markets. Then, rearranging the trading volumes gives
KDB = 1−
S
pi(1− φ)K
S
B,
KSB
PB
= pi + (1− pi)(1− θ) S
φθ
,
KSC =
1− pi
φ
PB
(
1− S
θ
)
, KDC =
SKSB
pi(1− φ) +
PBS
φ
− PB
φ
.
By equating KSC = K
D
C and substituting K
i
Bs, we get a quadratic equation for S. Namely, in the equilibrium, S
solves
S
1− φ +
(1− pi)(1− θ)
φpiθ(1− φ) S
2 +
S− 1
φ
− 1− pi
φ
+
1− pi
θφ
S = 0.
4
Note that the LHS is monotonically increasing in S(≥ 0), and the condition αI > 0 is identical to S < θ by
definition (8). Thus, in the equilibrium, αI > 0 if and only if
θ
1− φ +
(1− pi)(1− θ)
φpiθ(1− φ) θ
2 +
θ − 1
φ
− 1− pi
φ
+
1− pi
θφ
θ > 0,
which can be rewritten as
θ2(1− pi)− θ + pi(1− φ) < 0.
Note that if θ = 0 then the LHS of this inequality is positive, while if θ = 1 then it is negative. Thus, the
smaller solution of the equation θ2(1− pi)− θ + pi(1− φ) = 0 is between 0 and 1. We set this solution as θ0.
Thus, αI > 0 if and only if θ0 < θ ≤ 1.
Next, suppose that PC − (1− θ)PB ≤ 0. This induces αI = 0 by definition (8), and the equilibrium solves
KSC = 0, K
S
B = piPB + (1− pi)(1− θ)
PB
φ
, (29)
KDB = 1−
PB − PC
p˜iB − φ , K
D
C =
PB − PC
p˜iB − φ −
PC
φ
,
piB =
piPB
KB
.
By using the market clearing in C-market and the definition of piB, we obtain
KDB = 1−
mPB − φ
(1− φ)piPB K
S
B, K
S
B =
(
pi +
(1− θ)(1− pi)
φ
)
PB,
with m = 1+ piφ+ (1− pi)(1− θ). By clearing B-market, we have
PB =
φ(pi + (1− pi)(1− θ))
(2− θ(1− pi))(φpi + (1− pi)(1− θ)) , (30)
KB =
pi + (1− pi)(1− θ)
2− θ(1− pi) . (31)
Moreover, we can express the market clearing in B-market by using S:
KB
(
1+
S
pi(1− φ)
)
= 1.
By plugging the explicit solution of KB, we have
S =
pi(1− φ)
pi + (1− pi)(1− θ) .
Since S is monotonically increasing in θ, the condition PC − (1− θ)PB ≤ 0 is identical to θ < S, that is
θ2(1− pi)− θ + pi(1− φ) ≥ 0.
Therefore, the condition is θ ≤ θ0, and we have established that the equilibrium is continuous at θ = θ0.
Corollary 3. When θ ≤ θ0, PB, piB, Q, and vB are monotonically increasing in θ.
Proof. Results for PB and piB are obvious from (30) and (29) in Appendix C2.. By using (30) and (31), we have
Q =
(
pi + s
1+ pi + s
)2 φ
φpi + s
, s = (1− pi)(1− θ).
Then
dQ
ds
∝ 2(φpi + s)− (pi + s)(1+ pi + s) ≡ DQ,
and
(1− pi)DQ = −θ2(1− pi) + θ − 1+ 2pi(1− φ)1− pi < 0
5
where the last inequality comes from θ ≤ θ0. With the fact that ds/dθ < 0, we have dQ/dθ > 0. 
C3. Proof for Proposition 4 and 5
To see the uniqueness, we plot these KB’s against PB (see Figure 7). Obviously, KSB is positive linear function in
PB. We can also check that KDB is concave, has only one inflection point in PB > 0, and
dKDB
dPB
< 0 for a sufficiently
large PB. Since KDB = 1 > K
S
B at PB such that K
S
B = 0, these two curves cross only once in PB > 0.
First, by KDB + K
D
C = 1− PC/φ, and equating KDj = KSj , we obtain
PC =
φ
2− pi (1− piPB). (32)
Now, suppose that θ increases. This is represented by the red curves in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Effect of θ on B-market
We have
p∗ = φ
2− pi(1− φ) (33)
such that PB ≷ PC ⇔ PB ≷ p∗. Also, let g ≡ 1−θθ , η ≡ 1+ φpi2−pi . In the equilibrium, we have KSB = KDB ≡ KB, so
that they are respectively expressed as
KB = PB
[
pi +
(1− pi)
φ
gη
]
− 1− pi
2− pi g,
KB =
(1− φ)piPB
((1− φ)pi + η)PB − φ2−pi
. (34)
By equating these two equations and rearranging it in terms of y ≡ P−1B , we obtain
H(y, g) ≡
(
pi +
1− pi
φ
gη
)
− pi(1− φ)y
((1− φ)pi + η)− φ2−pi y
− 1− pi
2− pi gy = 0.
For this function, we have
∂H
∂g
=
1− pi
φ(2− pi) (2− pi(1− φ)− φy) > 0, (35)
∂H
∂y
= − pi(1− φ)((1− φ)pi + η)
[((1− φ)pi + η)− φ2−pi y]2
− 1− pi
2− pi g < 0. (36)
Note that both inequality comes from PB > PC (equivalently, PB > p∗). These confirm, by the implicit function
theorem, dPB/dθ > 0.
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We rearrange the equation for piB as
piB =
pi
pi + 1−piφ g(1− PCPB )
,
which implies
sgn
(
dpiB
dθ
)
= −sgn
(
dpiB
dg
)
= sgn
(
d
dg
[
g(1− PC
PB
)
])
.
By using (32), we can rewrite the inside of the last brackets:
1− PC
PB
= 1−
φ
2−pi (1− piPB)
PB
∝
2− pi(1− φ)− φy
2− pi .
Hence, the last term can be calculated as follows.
d
dg
[g (2− pi(1− φ)− φy)] = 2− pi(1− φ)− φy− gφ∂H/∂g
∂H/∂y
=
2− pi(1− φ)− φy
∂H/∂y
pi(1− φ)((1− φ)pi + η)
[((1− φ)pi + η)− φ2−pi y]2
> 0
where the second line comes from the implicit function theorem, and the third to last lines are due to (35), (36)
and PB > p∗. Thus, we established that dpiBdθ > 0. Also, KB is decreasing in θ, which is immediate from (34).
The statement (iii) can be checked by the decreasing KB and ∆P/∆p˜i = 1− KB in the equilibrium.
As for the price Q, (34) yields
QBS = PBKB =
(1− φ)piP2B
((1− φ)pi + η)PB − φ2−pi
.
Since the right hand side does not contain θ, taking a derivative of the last term is
dQ
dθ
=
dPB
dθ
dQ
dPB
∝ (η + (1− φ)pi)PB − 2φ2− pi .
Therefore, there is an inflection point
p∗∗ = 2φ
(η + (1− φ)pi)(2− pi) ,
which determines the sign of the effect:
dQ
dθ
≷ 0⇔ PB ≷ p∗∗. (37)
Now, by using the implicit formula H(P−1B , g) = 0 and the fact that PBH(P
−1
B , g) is monotonically increasing
in PB, the condition (37) is identical to
A(θ) ≡ g(1− pi) (2η − h) + 2pi[φ− (1− φ)(2− pi)] ≶ 0.
Note that A is monotonically decreasing in θ (this can be confirmed by using PB > p∗ again). By letting θ
fluctuate from θ0 to 1, we have the following result.
(i) If φ > (2− pi)/(3− pi), then A(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ0, 1], which implies that PB > p∗∗ always holds in
the equilibrium, leading to a monotonically decreasing Q. (ii) If φ ≤ (2− pi)/(3− pi), then A(1) < 0, so Q is
decreasing in high-θ region. To understand more global behavior, we need to check if A(θ0) ≷ 0. By seeing A
as a function of g, we can define g∗ that makes A(g) = 0 as
g∗(φ) = 2pi(2− pi − φ(3− pi))
(1− pi)(1− pi(1− φ) + φpi2−pi )
.
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Since A(g) is increasing in φ, we have dg∗/dφ < 0. Note that we are focusing on θ > θ0, which means
g < g0(φ) ≡ 1− θ0(φ)
θ0(φ)
.
From the definition of θ0, we know θ0 is decreasing and g0 is increasing in φ. We also have limφ→0 g∗(φ) > 0
and limφ→0 g0(φ) = I{pi<1/2}pi−1 because θ0 → I{pi≥1/2}+ I{pi<1/2} pi1−pi . Figure 8 shows the effect of a smaller
φ on g∗ and g0. We have following two possibilities.
Figure 8: Behavior of A
(ii-a) Suppose that pi ≥ 1/2. Then there is φ0 that solves
g∗(φ) = g0(φ). (38)
φ0 is uniquely determined from the discussion above. In this case, if φ < φ0, then A(g) < 0 for all g < g0.
That is Q is monotonically increasing in θ. If φ0 < φ < φ1, then we have A(g) ≷ 0 ⇔ g ≷ g∗. Thus, we
can define θ∗ = 1/(1+ g∗) ∈ (θ0, 1], and Q is increasing when θ > θ∗ and decreasing when θ < θ∗.
(ii-b) Also, consider the case with pi < 1/2. In this case, we have a unique pi∗ ∈ (0, 1/2) that solves
g∗(0) = 2pi(2− pi)
(1− pi)2 =
1
pi
= g0(0),
or equivalently
2pi3 − 3pi2 − 2pi + 1 = 0.
If pi∗ ≤ pi < 1/2, then g∗(0) > g0(0). This implies that we always have θ∗ defined by θ∗ = 1/(1+ g∗) ∈
(θ0, 1], and and Q is increasing when θ > θ∗ and decreasing when θ < θ∗. On the other hand, if
0 ≤ pi ≤ pi∗, then the arguments go back to the case (ii-a) and the same results hold.
D Welfare Analyses
D1. Welfare Analyses for Buyers under λ = 1
The buyers’ welfare in aggregate is
vB =
∫
α∗
(∆p˜iα− ∆P)dF +
∫
PC/φ
(φα− PC)dF
=
∆p˜i
2
(1− α∗)2 + φ
2
(1− PC
φ
)2
=
1
2
[
pi(1− φ)PBKB + φ(2− pi)2 (1− pi + piPB)
2
]
, (39)
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where the second term comes from α∗ = ∆P/∆p˜i, and the last term comes from (32), (13), KSj = K
D
j , and the
definition of piB:
∆p˜i = (1− φ)piPB
KB
.
The property of the first term is given by Proposition 5, while the second term is monotonically increasing in
θ. Furthermore, by using (34),
2vB = ((1− φ)pi)2 P
2
B
PB[η + pi(1− φ)]− φ2−pi
+
φ
(2− pi)2 (1− pi + piPB)
2.
Note that θ does not directly affect vB in this expression. By letting h ≡ η + pi(1− φ), we have
d2vB
dPB
≡ DB = ((1− φ)pi)2
PB(hPB − 2 φ2−pi )
(hPB − φ2−pi )2
+
2φpi
(2− pi)2 (1− pi + piPB).
The second order derivative yields
dDB
dPB
=
2((1− φ)pi)2
(hPB − φ2−pi )3
[(
hPB − φ2− pi
)2
− hPB
(
hPB − 2φ2− pi
)]
+
2φpi2
(2− pi)2
=
2((1− φ)pi)2
(hPB − φ2−pi )3
φ2
(2− pi)2 +
2φpi2
(2− pi)2 > 0.
We also have PB(θ = 1) ≡ pˆ1 = 1−φ+
φ
2−pi
h and can check DB(PB = pˆ1) > 0. Thus, if limθ→θ0 DB < 0, there is a
unique θ∗ such that DB ≷ 0⇔ θ ≷ θ∗, while if limθ→θ0 DB > 0, then DB > 0 for all θ.
The following formulas at θ = θ0 simplify the analyses. First, as θ ↘ θ0, we have
PC =
φ
2− pi (1− piPB) = (1− θ0)PB, (40)
∴ PB = p˜ ≡ φpiφ+ (1− θ0)(2− pi) . (41)
Moreover, at θ → θ0, we have αI → 0 by definition. Since the markets have to clear, at the limit,
lim
θ↘θ0
KDB = lim
θ↘θ0
(
1− PB − PC
piB(1− φ)
)
= lim
θ↘θ0
(
1− KDC −
PC
φ
)
= lim
θ↘θ0
(
1− (1− pi)αI − PCφ
)
= 1− 1− θ0
φ
p˜ =
1− pi + pi p˜
2− pi (42)
The first line is the definition, the second line is from the definition of KDC , the third line is from the market
clearing condition in C-market, and the fourth and fifth lines are from the definition of θ0 that gives αI = 0
and (40). The last line is the other expression from (40). Also, from (34)
lim
θ↘θ0
KB =
(1− φ)pi p˜
((1− φ)pi + η) p˜− φ2−pi
. (43)
Since markets have to clear, all of these expressions (42, 43) have to be identical. That is
(1− φ)pi p˜
hp˜− φ2−pi
= 1− 1− θ0
φ
p˜ =
1− pi + pi p˜
2− pi , (44)
at (41).
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Let DB,0 ≡ limθ↘θ0 DB. By using the equality of the first and last term in (44),
DB,0 ∝ (1− φ)pi
(
1−
φ
2−pi
hp˜− φ2−pi
)
+
2φpi
2− pi .
By using (44) once again, hp˜− φ2−pi = (1−φ)pi p˜1− 1−θ0φ p˜
. Thus,
DB,0 ∝ (1− φ)pi
1− φ
2− pi
1− 1−θ0φ p˜
(1− φ)pi p˜
+ 2φpi
2− pi
∝ [(1− θ0) + (2− pi)(1− φ)] + 2piφ− φp˜
= 1+ (1− pi)(θ0 − 2φ).
Note that θ0 is decreasing function of φ and limφ→1 θ0 = 0. Then, minφ DB,0 = limφ→1 DB,0 = 2pi − 1.
Therefore, if pi < 12 , we can define a unique φ = φ2 that solves
1+ (1− pi)(θ0 − 2φ) = 0.
If φ ≤ φ2 or pi > 1/2, then DB > 0 for all θ ∈ (θ0, 1], and vB is monotonically increasing. On the other hand, if
pi ≤ 1/2 and φ > φ2, then there is a unique θ∗∗ such that DB ≷ 0⇔ θ ≷ θ∗∗.
D2. Welfare of Sellers
The welfare of sellers hinges on the quality of assets they are allocated upon their arrival at the economy. The
aggregate welfare of H- and L-type sellers are defined as
vS,H =
∫
PB
αdF +
∫ PB
PBdF,
vS,L =
∫
PB
φ
φαdF +
∫ PB
φ
αI
((1− θ)PB + θφα)dF +
∫ αI
PCdF.
In both expressions, the first term is the welfare of inactive sellers, while the second term is the welfare of
sellers in B-market. The last term of vS,L comes from sellers of L-asset in C-market. It is easy to check the
following proposition:
Proposition 9. The welfare of sellers with high-quality assets, vS,H , is monotonically increasing in θ.
The innovation in blockchain always benefits sellers of high-quality assets because they can always sell
their asset in B-market at the higher price PB. On the other hand, the global effect of θ on vS,L is hard to
determine, though we can obtain the following local result:
Proposition 10. dvS,Ldθ
∣∣∣
θ=1
< 0, that is, θ = 1 cannot be the maximizer of vS,L.
Proof. See Appendix D3.. 
Together with Proposition 9, this implies that ex-post welfare of L-type sellers cannot agree with the welfare
of H-type sellers regarding the optimal θ.
To obtain more intuitions, we can separate vS,L into the welfare gain parts and the reservation welfare, as
in the case of buyers’ welfare,
vS,L = PC +
∫ 1
αI
((1− θ)PB − PC + θφα)dF +
∫ 1
PB
φ
(1− θ)(φα− PB)dF. (45)
First, all the L-type sellers certainly can obtain the reservation welfare of PC by selling the asset in C-market
(the first term in 45). If α > αI , the sellers change the behavior to either selling in B-market or keeping it.
The second term in (45) represents the welfare gain of sellers who will opt-out from C-market: all of them
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(α > αI) can potentially obtain the additional welfare by selling in B-market. Within this subgroup, agents
with relatively high α (such that α > PBφ ) prefer to keep the asset by giving up the revenue PB, which yields
the further welfare gain exhibited by the last term of vS,L.
The first and last terms are monotonically decreasing in θ. That is, the reservation welfare (the first term)
and the gain from changing behavior from selling in C-market to being inactive decline as the blockchain
market becomes more profitable. The sign of the impact on the middle term is affected by two competing
effects. On one hand, a higher θ boots the revenue by heightening PB. On the other hand, it reduces the
expected revenue by making the rejection risk higher. The total effect depends on how large the positive
welfare gain by the traders in B-market will be, and it is more likely to happen when the migration of buyers
from B-market is not so large due to the severe information asymmetry and large quality spread. In Appendix
D3., we provide further analyses regarding the welfare gain of sellers to complement Proposition 10 and show
that the effect of θ on vS,L depends on the elasticity of PB with respect to θ.
D3. Welfare Gain for Sellers
Hypothetically, consider a randomly picked seller who is deprived of the access to B-market. Ex-ante (before
she is endowed with the asset), she expects to have v0S = piv
0
S,H + (1 − pi)v0S,L, where v0S,i represents the
reservation welfare of the seller when she obtains the asset-i with i ∈ {L, H}. Specifically,
v0S,i =

∫ PC
0 PCdF +
∫ 1
PC
αdF for i = H∫ PC
φ
0 PCdF +
∫ 1
PC
φ
φαdF for i = L.
Note that PC is the equilibrium price in the segmented market economy rather than the single market economy
since we consider a non atomic agent who does not have any impact on the segmented market equilibrium.
For this agent, the expected welfare gain from having access to B-market is given by
∆vS = vS − v0S
= pi∆vS,H + (1− pi)∆vS,L. (46)
By applying uniform assumption, we obtain simple formulae:
∆vS,j =
{
1
2 (P
2
B − P2C) if j = H
(1− θ)∆P22φθ if j = L.
(47)
Obviously, ∆vS,H is monotonically increasing in θ since PC is monotonically decreasing in θ. Intuitively, the
reservation welfare for sellers with H-asset is decreasing in θ since the terms of trade in C-market will deteri-
orate if the blockchain technology improves. That is, the more secure the blockchain becomes, the larger the
gain from having the access to B-market will be for H-type sellers.
On the other hand, as for ∆vS,L, we have
d∆vS,L
dθ
=
∆P
2φ
[
∆P
dg
dθ
+ 2g
d∆P
dθ
]
where g = (1− θ)/θ. Since, PC = φ(1− piPB)/(2− pi) in the equilibrium, it becomes
d∆vS,L
dθ
=
∆P
2φ
dg
dθ
1
2− pi [[2− pi(1− φ)]PB(1− εP)− φ] , εP ≡ −
dPB/dg
PB/g
> 0. (48)
εP represents the elasticity of PB regarding the change in the security θ (since g and θ have negative monotone
relationship, we consider it as the effect of θ). When the elasticity is high, i.e., εP is large, ∆vS,L is increasing in θ.
Otherwise, it is decreasing in θ. Since the welfare gain of sellers with L-asset comes only from the transaction
through B-market, a higher θ has two competing effects. First, a higher θ increases the offer price PB in B-
market, which has a positive impact on the sellers’ welfare through a higher return from selling. This higher
PB proliferates the positive impact on ∆vS,L by inducing a higher probability of submitting selling order into
B-market. On the other hand, higher security level makes the rejection probability higher. This effect reduces
the gain for sellers with L-asset. Given that the latter effect is a direct consequence of θ, the first positive effect
dominates the latter effect when the increment of PB is large, namely, εP is high.
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When is the elasticity more likely to be high? It can be translated into the market equilibrium: a higher
PB confounds the demand when the cost of migration for the buyers is low. On the other hand, if the cost
of migration is high, the higher price can sustain itself, making the elasticity of PB high. Thus, ∆vS,L exhibits
upward sloping curve when (i) φ is low or (ii) ∆pi is large.
E Technology Overview
E1. Bitcoin
The leading example of cryptocurrency is Bitcoin. The idea of Bitcoin is first introduced by Nakamoto (2008),
who proposes the blockchain technology for the first time. The part of the objectives of this proposal is to offer
a solution to the “double spending” problem. Bitcoin is the first success after a long history of proposals of
decentralized media of transactions, making it the largest market capitalization in the cryptocurrency trading
market (Narayanan et al., 2016).43
The Bitcoin blockchain has recorded the information of the flow of bitcoins across participants (“Alice paid
X bitcoin to Bob”) in a tamper-proof manner. In this platform, the traded good is bitcoin itself. To have a
concrete idea, we aline the transaction of bitcoin with the example in Appendix A.
Suppose that, at date t = 0, liquidity providers have liquid assets (cash or bitcoin), and liquidity takers are
endowed with illiquid assets whose common value is k. At date t = 1, takers are hit by a liquidity shock and
want to offload (liquidate) their asset holding to obtain (net) utility vs − k from s amount of liquid cash (or
coin), where v is some positive private value. The state of liquidity providers at date t = 1 is either st ∈ {m, 0},
where st represents the amount of cash or bitcoin she holds.
To bridge the argument to the example introduced in Appendix A, we can think of the realization of s1 as
the result of cumulative transactions: there are dates t ∈ {−N,−(N − 1), · · · ,−1, 0}, and each has a state st
that represents cash flow at each date.
Suppose that s1 = 0 realizes (she already spent her cash or coin in the past) for 1− pi fraction of liquidity
providers, and rest of them have s1 = m.44 Since announcing sˆ1 = m is strictly dominant for all of the buyers,
1−pi fraction of them are fraudulent who attempt to use the coin or money they already spent (double-spend).
In the traditional cash market without a bank that monitors the accounts of her customers and transactions,
fraudulent agents easily spend their money twice (or more) as long as pivm > k, because this inequality means
that sellers want to sell the asset.
On the other hand, in the Bitcoin’s network, it is extremely difficult to spend the coin twice because even
if the agent with s1 = 0 claims sˆ1 = m, this cannot be an agreement. That is, θ fraction of 1− pi agents fail
to accomplish their fraud transactions, which makes the fraction of honest sellers pi(θ) = pi
pi+(1−θ)(1−pi) > pi.
This provides a higher expected return for liquidity takers, and hence they have an incentive to utilize the
blockchain platform rather than the traditional transaction.45 In the example of Bitcoin, θ is very high since
the double spending is precluded unless an agent has a prohibitively strong computing power.
E2. Ethereum
As explained in the main text, precluding double spending is not the only feature enabled by the blockchain
technology. It also allows us to write complex scripts to determine what kind of information is regarded and
added as “relevant” one.46 First, as mentioned earlier, the state information recorded on the blockchain is
highly credible. Second, by writing codes such that “transaction takes place if and only if the state s satis-
fies conditions (1)..., (2)...., and (N),” we can make a transaction contingent on desirable conditions (1)-(N).
This technology has many applications to mitigate informational problem in assets transactions, information
storage, and allocation.
The wine blockchain, founded by EY Advisory & Consulting Co. Ltd. offers a concrete example.47 Tra-
43As of February 8, 2018
44Assume that pi is common knowledge, and m < k < pivm hold so that transactions take place.
45Of course, knowing that θ fraction of “double spending” fails, the behavior of liquidity providers also changes. We do not go into
detail of this point here and leave it for the formal analyses in Section 3 of the main text.
46Technically speaking, the language for the scripts in Ethereum transactions is Turing-complete, a class of language that allows com-
plex statements. This capacity of allowing complexity makes state-contingent contracts possible.
47Other sectors outside the financial service industry, such as supply chain management, are also interested in digitizing and tracking
information of products. For example, Walmart Stores Inc. is testing a transaction system on IBM blockchain technology to manage
supply-chain data (https://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/presskit/50610.wss, visited on May 10, 2018). The products include porks,
mangoes, berries and a dozens of other products. It is aimed to identify bad sources throughout the overall chains of food product
intermediations.
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ditionally, wine market is exposed to a risk of counterfeit (“lemons” in the sense of Akerlof [1970]), whose
economic losses is said to be $1-5 billion per year.48 The problem of low-quality wines is severe since many
intermediaries are involved in a supply chain of wine, making it difficult to keep track of all the transactions
from ingredient firms to retail stores. By utilizing the blockchain and smart contract, however, transactions of
wines become almost free from the lemons’ problem without any credible third-parties or interventions.49
In contrast to the example of Bitcoin, which records a flow of coin as a state variable, this example can
be directly adopted to the preceding example in Appendix A. That is, state information can take a range of
characteristics: it can record a brand of ingredient, name of wine-producer, in what temperature and how long
a wine has been stored, and so on. This can also be applied to other classes of assets whose value is difficult to
identify for consumers. Given the descriptions of state information, Ethereum allows us to make transactions
conditional on realization of desirable states.
E3. Connection of Blockchain and Cryptocurrency
The two examples the blockchain above use cryptocurrency as a means of transaction. This class of blockchain
platforms includes the one for transactions of wines (EY, based on Ethereum), security (tZERO), international
remittance (Bitcoin), arts and photography (Kodak, based on KodakOne and KodakCoin), and more.
Another interesting example is Ripple. Although their underlying technology is not exactly the blockchain,
Ripple also utilizes a distributed ledger to provide secure transactions between banks and commercial firms,
in which cryptocurrency XRP is used. An approval of transaction is not made by Proof of Work (PoW) as in
the Bitcoin system, but it is done by a certified set of validating nodes. Hence a transaction is settled faster
than in the Bitcoin system, and waste of electricity inherent in the PoW system is relaxed.
There are also blockchain platforms that do not need circulation of cryptocurrencies as a medium of trans-
actions. For instance, EverLedger, providing the blockchain platform for exchanging a variety of assets (wine,
art, jewelry), claims that they have no interest in building their own cryptocurrency since they want to avoid
many political challenges.50 Moreover, a number of “permissioned blockchain” platforms do not need to use
digital currency or mining process to record information.
For a blockchain platform whose transactions are not necessarily executed by cryptocurrency, the model
provides an implication for the fundamental value (price) of the blockchain itself. Specifically, Proposition 6
of the main text proposes a theoretical measure for the price of these types of blockchain technology and show
that it corresponds to the welfare gain of participants in the network.
F Imposing Fee on Sellers
What if the suppliers (or producers of goods) have to pay the fee to use the blockchain? We can fall back on
the same logic to derive the maximum possible fee that the manager can charge on sell-side of the market,
which we denote as fS:
fS = ∆vS
with ∆vS in (16) of the main model.
When ∆vS,L is increasing in θ, the total fee fS is also increasing, while if ∆vS,L is decreasing, the form of fS
is ambiguous since it depends on the level of pi. Suppose that the parameter values make ∆vS,L decreasing
in θ. Under this situation, it seems natural to conclude that a lower pi makes fS downward sloping because
it puts more weight on ∆vS,L. However, this is not necessarily the case. For example, if we make pi → 0, we
have d∆vS,L/dθ → 0 and d fS/dθ → 0. This is because of the dominating L-asset in the market. As the level
of pi diminishes, the share of L-asset increases, and, at the limit, there are only L-asset in both of the markets.
This implies that having the access to B-market does not payout: the welfare gain converges to zero. Further
analyses on the sellers’ willingness to pay are provided in Appendix D as numerical experiments because of
the difficulty of an analytical characterization.
F1. Manager vs. Sellers
Next, suppose that the manager makes money by imposing the fee on the sell-side of the market, while the
government tries to maximize sellers’ welfare. From (16), (17), and (18), we know the followings: the welfare
48For example, see Holmberg (2010) and Przyswa (2014).
49See Buterin (2016) for more details.
50http://www.eweek.com/cloud/hyperledger-blockchain-project-is-not-about-bitcoin
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gain of H-asset holders is monotonically increasing, imposing a positive pressure on fS, while that of L-asset
holders has an ambiguous effect. Moreover, Proposition 8 implies that, as long as fS is monotonically increas-
ing in θ due to the dominating effect from d∆vS,H/dθ, the optimal θ set by the manager cannot agree with
θ that maximizes vS,L. Thus, the welfare of H-asset holders is maximized, while sellers with L-quality asset
incur welfare loss. Proposition 8 implies that there is a conflict between the welfare of H-asset holders and
L-asset holders: once the type of asset is realized, even the social planner cannot maximize the welfare of both
types of traders.
Since we cannot analytically characterize the properties of sellers’ welfare further, we rely on the numerical
examples. We find the total fee revenue is upward sloping, and the maximizing fS agrees with maximizing
vS,H in most ranges of parameters. Note that the discussion around elasticity makes clear in what situation
this welfare loss tends to occur.
Figures and Tables
The following figures provide the numerical examples for the sellers’ welfare and fees. Parameters take pi ∈
{0.01, 0.1, 0.4, 0.7, 0.9}, and φ ∈ {0.35, 0.5, 0.7}. The first (second) column shows the total and reservation
welfare of H-type (L-type) sellers, as well as the fee imposed by the manager, fS. The third column is the plot
of the total (ex-ante) welfare of sellers and fS.
As suggested by the theory, vH is monotonically increasing in θ, while vS,L is either monotonically de-
creasing or hump-shaped. If fS can be decreasing in θ, that should occur when θ is relatively high. However,
even if we set the share of L-type sellers large (pi = 0.01), the configuration of fS is upward sloping. This is
because the change in θ affects vS,L mostly through the change in v0S,L when pi is small. That is, the welfare
gain for L-type seller, vS,L − v0S,L, is not affected by θ (see the difference between blue and green-dotted lines).
Of course, a higher θ increases the welfare gain from trading in B-market. Meanwhile, it reduces the welfare
gain in C-market, which has a dominating effect on the welfare because only 1− θ fraction of selling attempt
get to have a benefit of a higher θ.
Figure 9: Welfare of Sellers and Fee: pi = 0.01
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Figure 10: Welfare of Sellers and Fee: pi = 0.1
Figure 11: Welfare of Sellers and Fee: pi = 0.4
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Figure 12: Welfare of Sellers and Fee: pi = 0.7
Figure 13: Welfare of Sellers and Fee: pi = 0.9
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